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Resumen: Se presenta un modelo donde una norma social se internaliza por los 
agentes. Los infractores de la norma son estigmatizados, lo que se 
refleja en una reducción de utilidad. El costo del estigma, sin embargo, 
se reduce conforme crece el número de personas que no cumplen dicha 
norma. El modelo se aplica al análisis del trabajo infantil. En equili-
brio, el costo del estigma esperado y observado es igual y el mercado 
laboral se vacía, tanto de mano de obra infantil como de adultos. La 
interacción estratégica da origen a multiplicidad de equilibrios. 
Abstract: This paper constructs a model in which a social norm is internalized. 
The social disapproval of people who violate the norm -stigmatization-
is incorporated as a reduction in their utility. That reduction in utility 
is lower as the proportion of the population that violates the norm 
increases. In the model, society disapproves of people sending their 
children to work and parents care about that "embarrassment". An 
equilibrium is constructed in which the expected and realized stigma 
costs are the same; and the wages rates of child and adult labor are 
such as to equate demand and supply for each kind of labor. 
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Nature, when she formed man for society, endowed him with 
an original desire to please, and an original aversion to offend his brethren... She 
rendered their approbation most nattering and most agreeable to him for its own 
sake; and their disapprobation most mortifying and most offensive. 
Adam Smith 
1. Introduction 
In every society, a set of rules regarding filial obligations determine 
different behavioral standards within the household. These rules es-
tablish what actions are acceptable by the community and they have 
an effect on parents' attitudes towards their children and vice versa.
1 
There are different ways in which these social norms or conventions 
may be enforced. A recent paper by Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull 
(1998) has modeled the case of a social norm that is enforced by 
social stigma and the individual's preference for avoiding stigma or 
embarrassment. The explicit recognition of such norms in parental 
decision, making concerning child labor as in the model of Basu and 
Van (1998) can give us some important practical insights concerning 
the incidence of child labor and policy measures for combating the 
problem. That is what this paper is concerned with. 
The model proposed here assumes that a parent who sends her 
child to the labor market is likely to face a social stigma that reduces 
her own welfare. The second key assumption will be that the social 
stigma is lower the higher the aggregate incidence of child labor. The 
latter is a consequence of the reasonable assumption that a society 
is more tolerant of a practice that is widely prevalent (see Lindbeck, 
Nyberg and Weibull, 1998). Multiple equilibria will arise, where some 
equilibria show no child labor in the economy and relatively high 
wages, whereas others present higher incidence of child labor and 
lower wages. The model solves simultaneously the formation of the 
level of stigma and the equation of demand and supply in the adult 
and child labor markets. 
The contribution of this paper to the literature is twofold. First, 
it incorporates the effect of social norms on child labor decisions, ad-
dressing an important issue that has been previously neglected in the 
1 As an example, see the discussion about such rules and its effects on fertility 
and human capital investment decisions in Dasgupta (1993) and Ray (1998). A SOCIAL STIGMA MODEL  195 
literature on the subject.
2 Second, it provides an alternative expla-
nation of child labor that originates in social interactions, resulting 
multiplicity of equilibria as in Basu and Van (1998). Additionally, 
in this case the existence of multiple equilibria is robust to different 
specifications of the demand for labor in the economy. This is espe-
cially significant because it means that multiple equilibria (one where 
children work and another where they do not) can occur even in a 
small, open economy. As Dixit (1998) noted, this does not happen in 
Basu and Van's (1998) model. 
This paper consists of five sections. The following section briefly 
reviews the interactions between social norms and behavior, providing 
a definition of what is understood as a social norm or convention. 
Section three develops a simple example to show the multiplicity of 
equilibria arising through the social convention that imposes a social 
cost on those that send their children to work. Section four introduces 
the interaction between the social stigma cost and wages, capturing 
the idea that parents who can afford not to bear the burden of sending 
their children to work will'avoid that practice. The final section 
provides some concluding remarks. 
2. Norms, Stigma, and Economic Decisions: Motivation and 
Pertinent Literature 
Two issues will be discussed in this section. The first is the incorpo-
ration of social norms in the analysis and its relevance for a better 
understanding of the economic behavior. The second concerns the 
type of norm used in this paper, one that is enforced through a "so-
cial stigma", embedded in the preferences. This "social stigma" type 
of a norm has been previously used in the literature to analyze the wel-
fare system (Besley and Coate, 1992 ; Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull, 
1998) and crime incidence and its persistence (Rasmusen, 1995). 
The study of the effect of social norms on economic behavior has 
grown in recent years.
3 Following Weber (1922), several categories 
2 Thorough reviews of the literature can be found in Grootaert and Kanbur 
(1995) and Basu (1999). Lopez-Calva (2001) contains a review of the empirical 
findings. 
3 See, for example, Besley and Coate (1992), Basu (2000); Basu, Jones and 
Schlicht(1987); Young (1998); Bendor and Mookherjee (1990); Boyd and Richard-
son (1994); Schlicht (1993, 1998); Binmore and Samuelson (1994); and Elster 
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of repeated collective practices can be distinguished as formal and 
informal guidelines of behavior. These are usage, custom, conven-
tion, and law.
4 According to Weber, usage refers to an action that 
is observed to recur regularly but may change and evolve over time, 
whereas custom, is when a specific usage prevails for an extended pe-
riod of time. A convention or social norm is a part of the custom to 
which people adhere voluntarily, without internalization, but which 
does not require formal enforcement. People adhere to norms because 
they are protected against violation by sanctions of social disapproval. 
The law, on the contrary, is a set of behavioral rules that require a 
formal "staff' to enforce them, e.g., the court.
5 The economic liter-
ature uses social norms and custom under the term "conventions", 
emphasizing the fact that they are enforced informally. In this pa-
per, internalized norms will be called "preference-changing" -closer to 
Weber's definition of custom, whereas those that require informal so-
cial enforcement will be termed "rationality limiting"- as in Weber's 
definition of norms or conventions.
6 
Internalization of the norm into the preferences is itself a self-
enforcement mechanism. People may incorporate certain rules into 
their preferences, and norms prevail through the feelings of embarrass-
ment, anxiety, guilt, and shame that occur when they violate them 
(Elster, 1989; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). Disapproval by members 
of the group a person belongs to may reduce that person's welfare 
by affecting her sense of belongingness, her identity. This is the type 
of effect that can be modeled as a "stigma". A second enforcement 
mechanism is when the convention requires a punishment or "social 
sanction" by the community in order for the norm to be sustain-
able, in a folk theorem type of argument. This idea has been used, 
for example, to explain informal reciprocal cooperation arrangements 
in poor communities (Coate and Ravallion, 1993). Yet one alter-
native role that norms may plav in economic interactions is that of 
focal points in interactions with multiple equilibria. Those are called 
"equilibrium-selection" norms (Basu, 2000). The same equilibrium 
selection perspective has been analyzed from an evolutionary perspec-
tive in Young (1998). The main result tells us under what conditions 
efficient norms in a welfare sense would survive over time and which 
ones would disappear through evolutionary pressure. 
4 In this paper, social norm and convention will be used interchangeably. 
5 See the discussion in Swedherg (1993). 
6 The terminology, though not the analogy to Weber's taxonomy, is introduced 
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2.1. Social Stigma 
The type of social norms modeled in this paper is one in which parents 
are stigmatized when they send their children to work. Sending a child 
to work is is not well accepted in the community. Thus parents bear a 
social reputation cost when they decide to do so. The literature tells 
us that the existence of values like this different according to the stage 
of development and cultural traditions. Lindbeck (1997) mentions 
that norms in favor of work to support oneself evolved over time, 
before and after the existence of the modern welfare state in advanced 
countries. Prior to the existence of a developed society, "...it must also 
have been in the interest of relatives and friends, particularly parents, 
to promote good working habits in the younger generation so as to 
prevent free-riding on the altruism of others in the future" (Lindbeck, 
1997, p. 2). In the same way, however, those norms may have changed 
over time as the economies grew richer and were able to establish 
mechanisms so that people could save, educate their children, and 
use the benefits of the welfare system. Nowadays, different kinds 
of filial obligations are observed as natural across countries and for 
different levels of development. In poor countries, for example, it is 
possible to find children working in rural areas with few members 
of the communitv Questioning the practice understood as standard 
behavior. As the economies°deveiop and urbanization takes place, 
those values could be expected to change. 
As the idea of child labor becomes less acceptable in the commu-
nity, parents that incur that practice bear a reputation cost, a stigma. 
In a classic sociological study, Goffman (1963, p. 3) defines stigma as 
a concept that is strongly linked to the idea of identity and sense of 
belongingness, 
...(when a person) is presented before us, evidence can arise of his 
possessing an attribute that makes him different from others in the category of 
persons available for him to be, and of a less desirable kind -in the extreme, a 
person who is quite thoroughly bad, or dangerous, or weak. 
Such an attribute is a stigma, Goffman says, and "...he is thus reduced 
in our minds from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted 
one". That is the type of perception that is assumed in the model 
below, one which reduces the utility level of the individual to whom 
the stigma is attached. 
There are two reasons why people may want to impose a social 
stigma on parents that send their children to work. First, people 198 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
may attach a moral content to such a decision and see child labor 
as morally unacceptable. Second, on a more practical level, adults 
may see child labor as a practice that depresses the level of wages 
in the economy and harms labor market conditions. Hence, a norm 
may emerge, establishing that sending a child to the labor market is 
unacceptable to the community. The latter reason is related to the 
interaction between the adult and the child labor markets, analyzed, 
for example, in Basu and Van (1998). These two perspectives, the 
moral principle and the practical rationale, do not necessarily oppose 
each other. A paper analyzing the results of the US Census of 1900 
states that 
...child labor, of necessity, will affect the conditions under which adults 
have to work, and to some degree also will affect their chances for wages. It is 
but fair to assume that in the same measure as females replaced men as factory 
workers, so child labor, if not restricted, will crowd a proportionate number of 
adults out of employment. Child labor, therefore, is not desirable and should be 
restricted. (Moersch, 1902, pp. 101-102). 
On the other hand, the same article provides data about the state 
that showed the lowest level of child labor, Minnesota, saying that 
...this denotes a condition which its citizens should strive to preserve, 
for it bears with it a great blessing for the young generation. They are much more 
fortunate than the many other children in other states who have to enter upon 
factory life at a time when they should build up their bodies and brains for the 
great struggle of life. (Moersch, 1902, p. 102). 
Both arguments against child labor, the moral and the practical rea-
sons, are thus coexisting. 
The issue of whether a norm like the one analyzed here indeed 
exists is an empirical question. In what follows, the norm will be as-
sumed to exist and its effects will be discussed. One piece of evidence 
that can be used to support the existence of such a stigma in real-
ity, in addition to the discussion in policy circles, full of normative 
statements and condemnatory judgments of this practice, is the well-
known issue of underreporting of child labor in household surveys.
7 
The empirical literature on child labor has typically discussed the fact 
that parents who do not face any legal threat if they reveal that they 
send their children to work below the legal age, still tend to declare 
7 See the discussion in Basu (1999) and Grootaert and Patrinos (1998). A SOCIAL STIGMA MODEL 199 
that their children do not work or work less than they actually do. 
This is typically justified by a certain degree of "shame" the parents 
may feel by declaring truthfully.
8 Social embarrassment is indeed a 
plausible explanation. 
3. A Simple Model with Multiple Equilibria 
Mai comune, mezzo gaudio, a popular Italian saying tells us.
9 It 
is believed that whenever people go through bad times, feeling that 
others share those bad conditions may make them feel less sad. As 
introduced above, let us assume there is a social norm that says if you 
send your child to work, you are considered a bad parent. Sending a 
child to work produces embarrassment -a social stigma cost- that is 
reflected in lower utility. That embarrassment, however, will be lower 
the higher the proportion of people that are violating the norm. The 
higher the level of child labor in the economy, the lower the social 
stigma cost, for a given supply of child labor for a specific household. 
Our model presents a model similar to that of setting Akerlof and 
Kranton (2000). They introduce a utility function that depends on 
the consumption of goods and services, the individuals own actions 
and the actions of others, and a given "prescription" (something that 
should or should not be done). This is exactly the setting we propose 
here. 
In this model, the aggregate level of child labor, E, shall be taken 
as given by individual households. The effect of one individual's de-
cision on the aggregate variable is seen as negligible by the concerned 
decision-maker. The expectation of what the aggregate level would 
be, though, will influence the optimal level of child labor for the 
decision-maker in the household. 
Let us suppose that we have N households in the economy, each 
one composed of one adult and one child. The general specification of 
preferences is given by a utility function, E, W = W(c,e,E), whose 
arguments are total household consumption, c, the child's effort level, 
e € [0,1], which denotes the fraction of the child's non-leisure time 
8 Asa referee has pointed out, people also under-report income because they 
do not believe that there is no legal threat. The later may also be true. I would 
argue, however, that in either case the reason for under-reporting is unknown, 
and we would have to gather subjective data for a subjective concept to make 
sure that our explanation, though plausible in both cases, can be verified. 
9 "Common malady, half happiness". 200 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
spent at work, number of hours at work, and the aggregate level 
of child labor in the economy. The last two arguments are related 
to what will be termed the "stigma cost". It will be assumed that 
the utility function is separable in consumption and "stigma cost", 
the latter being a function of e and E. The social stigma reduces the 
parent's utility. There will be one decision maker in the household, the 
parent, following the tradition of the unitary model (Becker, 1965). 
The problem of the parents is then: 
maxc,e W(c,e,E) = U(c)-S(e,E) (1) 
s.t. 
c < w + wce (2) 
where the wages of the adults and the children are to and wc, respec-
tively. Both w and wc are later determined endogenously, though 
each household treats these (as well as E) to be given. The assump-
tion on the functions U(c) and 5(e, E) are Uc > 0, Ucc < 0, Se > 0, 
See > 0, 5(0, E) = 0, eSE < 0, and finally SeE < 0, i.e., the marginal 
disutility from child's effort is decreasing in the total amount of child 
labor in the economy. The first four assumptions are standard while 
5(0, E) = 0 captures the fact that the stigma cost is zero if the child 
is not working. The latter implies that if e = 0, then SE = 0. The 
condition eSE < 0 implies that if e > 0, SE < 0. In other words, an 
increase in aggregate child labor weakly diminishes the stigma cost, 
provided that the child is working in the .first place. Note that these 
assumptions imply that S(e,E) > 0 whenever e > 0. Therefore, it 
is being assumed that even if E is very large, as long as one child's 
works the stigma cost does not vanish. Thus, child labor is not a 
value neutral activity with a reward for keeping up with the Jones. 
It is something that society considers to be inherently "bad". 
Clearly, the constraint will always be binding, since Uc{ ) > 0. 
Hence, we may insert (2) into the utility function of the agent, (1), 
and obtain the first order condition 
U'(w + wce)wc = Se(e,E) (3) 
which simply states that the marginal benefit of an extra unit of child 
labor supplied, measured in terms of utility from extra consumption, 
has to equal the marginal cost, as given by the stigma to be borne 
by the parent, as a function of individual and aggregate child la-
bor supply. From (3), it is possible to obtain the optimal amount 
of child labor hours supplied by the individual household, given by A SOCIAL STIGMA MODEL  201 
e*(w, wc, E). Hence, the agent considers the wage rates and the ex-
pected level of child labor in the economy, E, in order to choose the 
optimal number of hours that her child should work. 
The aggregate level of child labor in the economy in equilibrium, 
E*, must satisfy a natural aggregate consistency requirement (Basu, 
1987; Becker, 1991; and Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull, 1998). The 
consistency requirement shall be termed the "rational expectations 
property". The set of E that satisfies such a property is denned as 
Let us now turn to the description of firms. Firms maximize 
profit using a production function whose only input is "effective" units 
of labor, i.e., adult and child labor corrected by the adult equivalence 
parameter, 7, which tells us how productive a child is compared to 
an adult. In other words, it is assumed, for analytical simplicity, that 
adult labor and child labor are substitutes, subject to an equivalency 
correction. 
Thus, for a firm that employs A adults and C children, its effec-
tive labor input is L = A + -yC. Given the assumptions, it is obvious 
that if 7w < wc, no firm will employ children and if jw > wc no firm 
will employ adults. Hence, whenever both adults and children work, 
7w = wc. From now on, it will be assumed, without loss of generality, 
that this is the case. Then, whenever it is said that the adult wage is 
w, it should be presumed that child wage is jw. 
With this in mind, note that if the wage is w, then the represen-
tative firm maximizes TT = f(L) - wL, and the first order condition 
is simply f'(L) = w. Assume constant returns to scale, so that prof-
its are equal to zero. The optimal amount of effective units of labor 
demanded is 
Without loss of generality, let us assume that this economy has 
only one firm. We are now in a position to define an equilibrium. 
Intuitively, an equilibrium is a situation where the demand for child 
labor is equal to its supply, the demand for adult labor equals the 
demand of adult labor, and the amount of child labor satisfies the 
rational expectations property discussed above. 
The equilibrium for this economy Can now be defined formally as 
a triple (w*,w*,E*) such that: 
L* = f'-\w) 
(i) iw* = w*c, 202 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
(ii) E* G ip(w*,-yw*), 
and 
(in) N + -yE* = f'~
1(w*) 
Condition (n) above establishes that the aggregate level of child 
labor must satisfy the rational expectations property at the equilib-
rium, i.e., each parent's choice of e, given wages and expected level of 
E, must result in E*. The third condition, {in), is the market clearing 
in the labor market, in terms of effective units of labor. The wage 
w* must be such that the firm's demand equals the summation of N 
(adult labor supply) and total child labor supply in effective units, 
In order to show in a simple way the multiplicity of equilibria 
introduced by the social interactions in this model, let us assume that 
U(c) = ln(c). Using this specification of U{c) has the advantage that 
the optimal supply of labor will be independent of the level of wages, 
which allows us to illustrate the main result in a simple manner. In 
the next section, this specification is changed so as to incorporate the 
interaction with wages. The first order condition is as follows: 
Se(e,E) (5) 
(1 + 7C) 
It is easy to show that the model yields strategic complementarity 
in terms of child labor supply, for any positive level of e. In this case, 
strategic complementarity depends on the sign of 
de* 
dE ' 
which can be obtained by totally differentiating (5): 
dE -ySe + (1 + 7e)5ee - ^ ' 
and this will be a strict inequality for e > 0. 
Thus, under the reasonable assumptions made above, to wit 
SeE < 0, Se > 0, and See > 0, strategic complementarity obtains. 
Expectations regarding the aggregate level of child labor in the econ-
omy, i.e., what the others will do, affect each individual's decision 
and thus the outcome, opening up the possibility of multiple equilib-
ria, as shown in figure 1. The response of the agents to the expected A SOCIAL STIGMA MODEL 203 
aggregate level of child labor results in multiple rational expectations 
equilibria, shown as points A, B, and C in the figure. The social ef-
fect is introduced by the norm, given that the adult's expectation of 
E determines the expected stigma cost -"embarrassment" level- she 
will face for a given e. 
Figure 1 
Multiplicity with Social Interactions 
Ne(w,jw,E) 
The possibility of multiple equilibria in the labor market is shown 
in figure 2, for a given shape of the stigma cost.
1
0 The horizontal axis 
is in units of x, which is defined as aggregate child labor measured 
1
U It is important to note that a linear specification of the stigma cost, given 
that e is bounded both from above and below, would result in the same multipli-
city. 204 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
in adult equivalence, x = 7 E. The distance OA in the quadrant be-
low is equal to N, and represents the fact that parents supply their 
labor inelastically. The main quadrant shows the points that satisfy 
the rational expectations property for E, points A, B, and C. The 
vertical axis represents the total amount of effective child labor sup-
plied in response to the expected aggregate level, E, for given wages. 
The total amount of effective child labor supplied in response to the 
expected aggregate level is obtained by correcting for adult equiva-
lence the optimal amount supplied by the individual household, and 
multiplying it by the number of households, N. 
Figure 2 
Rational Expectations Equilibria and the Labor Market 
The quadrant below in figure 2 is the one that depicts the market 
clearing in the labor market, showing the demand for effective units 
of labor, L* = f'-
1(w), as well as the supply. The supply is inelastic A SOCIAL STIGMA MODEL  205 
with respect to wages and determined by the expectations about E 
(see first order condition). The two stable rational expectations equi-
libria are A and C. These determine two stable equilibria in the labor 
market, A' and C, as shown in the quadrant below. 
The main result thus obtains: 
1) One equilibrium is at C, where wages are low and children 
work; and 
2) A second equilibrium is represented by A', with high wages 
and no child labor. 
This result derives directly from the social stigma attached to 
parents who send their children to work, and the quite realistic as-
sumption that such an "embarrassment" decreases as the proportion 
of children working in the economy increases. Thus, a social norm, 
sustained through social pressure, results in a coordination problem. 
The existence of multiple equilibria is robust to different spec-
ifications of the demand for labor. Suppose this is a small, open 
economy, which implies that the labor demand is perfectly elastic at 
a given wage level, D". The two stable equilibria are then A" and C". 
The existence of multiple equilibria is robust to that specification, as 
opposed to the model in Basu and Van (1998). Though the wage level 
in such a case does not change, one of the stable equilibria shows no 
child labor and the other full child labor supply. 
4. Extension: Wages Affecting the Set of Rational Expecta-
tions Equilibria 
In the model presented above the wages do not play any role. The 
example was used to illustrate in the simplest case the possibility of 
multiple equilibria introduced by the social norm. The use of a more 
general utility function than U{c) = ln(c) makes the rational expec-
tations property sensitive to wages. This provides a more realistic 
setting and also allows us to analyze the validity in this setting of 
the "luxury axiom" proposed in Basu and Van (1998). In order to 
be consistent with the latter model, the utility function, whose argu-
ments are the same as before, is taken to be of the Stone-Geary type, 
specified as: 
Where c is the subsistence level of consumption, z is a constant, 
c, and e are defined as before. The aggregate level of child labor, E, 
(c - c) [z- es(E)} if c > c 
(c - c) if c < c 206 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
is normalized as E = §, so that E is the total proportion of avail-
able child labor time that is actually in the labor market. Notice that 
E e [0, 1]. Consumption still represents total household consumption. 
Thus, for consumption above the subsistence level, c, the agents care 
about the stigma cost, which is increasing in e and decreasing in E, 
riven that s'(E) < 0 For simnlicitv assume that s(l) > 0 and 
z=s(0) the latter being the maximum stigma cost when no aggre-
gate child labor is offered in the labor market but the household is 
contemplating full time work by the child. It is easy to verify that 
Uc > 0,
1
1 Ucc = 0, Se > 0, See = 0, SE < 0, and S * < 0. In this 
case, when household consumption falls below the subsidence level, 
only consumption matters. 
As before, agents take the expected level of aggregate child la-
bor, E, as given, and decide on the optimal level of child labor, e\ 
at the given wage, w. The equilibrium for this economy is defined 
as in section 3 above, namely a triple (w*,w*, E*) such that the la-
bor market clears, wages for children equal the wages of the adults 
corrected for productivity, and the individual and aggregate propor-
tions of child labor are consistent in the rational expectations sense 
described above. 
In the case where the total potential income of the households 
when they send the child to work full time is below the subsistence 
level of consumption, i.e., w +1W < c, full child labor will unambigu-
ously occur (e* = 1). This establishes result 1. 
RESULT 1. There exists a sufficiently low level of wages, w = j^, 
below which full child labor supply occurs, regardless of the expected 
stigma cost. 
If the potential income of parents is not enough to reach the sub-
sistence level, even if they send their children to work, substitution 
possibilities are lost and they only care about consumption. In this 
case full child labor supply occurs. Whether such a wage can oc-
cur in equilibrium or not depends on labor demand conditions in the 
economy, as will be evident from the discussion below. 
For the range of wages where the stigma cost plays a role, the 
first order condition of the decision maker is: 
[z - es(E)]wy =(w(l + 7e) - c)[s(E)} (7) 
1
1 Strictly speaking, Uc > 0 as long as Z - es(E) > 0. If z - es{E) = 0, 
then Uc = 0. A SOCIAL STIGMA MODEL  207 
since c = w(l + 7e). Combining result 1 and expression (7), it is possi-
ble to characterize the optimal supply of child labor for the household 
as: 
e = < 
mid< 1, 




 w ^ 
2s(E) 2W1 27 J -1 + 7 
c 
(8) 
1 if w < 
1 + 7 
The upper line of the expression above means that the child 
labor supply would be the mid-value among the three expressions 
in brackets. Given the fact that household's child labor supply is 
normalized to lie between zero and one, whenever the expression 
z 
7^- + 
2s(E) 2wy 27 
becomes larger than or equal to one, child labor will be one, whereas 
for levels below zero, the intermediate value will be zero, and so will 
child labor supply. 
According the "luxury axiom", there should be a high enough 
level of wage beyond which parents would choose not to send their 
children to work. In this model, such an idea is reflected in the fact 
that, for high enough wages, parents can "afford" not to bear the 
stigma cost and will not send their children to work. That outcome, 
however, would only be sustainable if it satisfied the equilibrium con-
ditions. There exists, indeed, a high enough level of wages above 
which child labor supply would be zero, as shown in result 2. 
RESULT 2. There exists a high enough level of wages, namely 
cs(l) 
S(l)-7*(0)' 
such that child labor supply in the economy will be zero, regardless of 
the expected level of aggregate child labor. 
This can be verified by solving for the wage level that would make 
e* < 0, for É = 1, i.e., for the lowest possible stigma cost. This is the 
case when 
c 1 
+ — < 0. 
2^(iy
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Solving for w, the result obtains. Hence, e* > 0 is never optimal 
above that wage level. 
Results 1 and 2 are represented in figure 3 by the bold segments 
of the labor supply curve that are perfectly inelastic below w and 
above w. Along one of them, only adults supply labor (w > w), so 
total labor supply is N. Along the other segment, there is full child 
labor (w < w), and total labor supply in effective units is JV(1 + 7). 
In order to characterize the supply of labor in this economy, it 
is necessary to investigate what the optimal supply of child labor is 
for wages between w and w. First, it is imperative to find out the 
minimum level of wage at which children are withdrawn from the 
labor market, in the sense that it is optimal for the household to 
choose zero children working time, if the expected level of aggregate 
child labor supply is equal to zero. Likewise, let us find the maximum 
level of wage at which parents would respond with full child labor 
when expecting full child labor in the economy. 
These two wage levels correspond to the lowest wage for which 
an equilibrium with no child labor is possible, and the highest wage at 
which full child labor is plausible, respectively. These are established 
in result 3. 
RESULT 3. The minimum wage level at which an equilibrium with 
zero child labor is feasible under the rational expectations property, is 
wo>j^- On the other hand, full child labor would only be feasible 
for wage levels 
cs(l) 
Wl~ 8(1) [27 + l] -7*(0) 
The way these two are obtained is as follows. First, let us find a wage 
so that e* < 0 for an expected level of aggregate labor in the economy 
E = 0. That is, 
[e* I E = 0] < 0 + ^ - ^ < 0- (
9) 
Using the fact that z = s(0) and solving (9) for w,w0 > 
is obtained. This establishes that at wage levels WQ or above, "there 
exists an equilibrium where child labor is eliminated, satisfying the 
consistency with the rational expectations property. Second, follow-
ing a symmetric procedure, we obtain the wage level at which child 
labor is equal to one, given the expectation that the aggregate pro-
portion of child labor in the economy will be one. A SOCIAL STIGMA MODEL  209 
Figure 3 
Multiplicity of Equilibria Under Minimum Assumptions 
Before moving on to the full characterization of the labor supply, 
it is important to mention that the results so far already allow for 
multiple equilibria (see figure 3, points Ex and E2).
n Moreover, as 
stated in result 4 below, a sufficient condition for a potential mul-
tiplicity when the demand for labor is perfectly elastic is that the 
i
i A necessary condition for multiplicity of equilibria is the existence of strate-
gic complementarity, i.e., e* increases with E. In this example, 
d'E 2a(B)V(J5) 
given that s'(E) < 0. Thus, strategic complementarity holds. This is not, 
however, a sufficient condition. 210 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
stigma cost increases rapidly as people withdraw their children from 
the labor market when one's own child continues to work.
1
3 
RESULT 4. Assume that the labor demand is perfectly elastic. A suffi-
cient, though not necessary, condition for the existence of a range of 
wages in which multiple equilibria exist is that s(0) > 3s(l). 
The condition stated in result 4 allows for equilibria like E3 and 
EA in figure 3. It is, however, a relatively strong condition. From 
figure 3, it can be easily verified that equilibria like E1,E2,EZ, and 
Ei are stable in the sense that after small perturbations around those 
points, the market mechanism would guarantee that the economy 
would return to the initial situation through excess demand and price, 
i.e., wage - adjustments. Those points are also consistent with the 
rational expectations property and stable from the point of view of 
social interactions. The analysis below will distinguish between two 
types of equilibrium stability, for which the following definitions are 
required. 
NORM-STABLE EQUILIBRIA. Is an equilibrium point to which the econ-
omy would return after a small perturbation and where the adjustment 
mechanism takes place through social interactions, i.e., through the 
corresponding adjustment of the individual's own child's labor supply 
as a response to expected aggregate child labor, at the given wages. 
MARKET-STABLE EQUILIBRIA. 7s an equilibrium to which the econ-
omy would eventually return after a small perturbation and where the 
adjustment mechanism takes place purely through excess-demand and 
wage changes. 
The distinction between those two types of equilibrium stability 
in the model is important, for the mechanism through which the 
adjustment takes place is different in an interesting way. In the case of 
market-stability the mechanism is standard excess demand and price, 
in this case, wage - adjustment. In the case of norm-stability the 
adjustment takes place through social interactions: adjustments in 
the individual's own child labor supply affect the expected level of 
aggregate child labor and thus individual responses, which in turn 
affect wages and then lead to a new adjustment in expectations and 
actual of aggregate child labor. 
1
3 That is, the relative stigma cost of sending one's child full time to work when 
there is zero child labor in the economy is high enough, as compared to the cost 
incurred when there is full child labor. A SOCIAL STIGMA MODEL  211 
With these definitions, let us analyze the types of potential mul-
tiplicity. Assume that the stigma cost function is such that the opti-
mal child labor supply, as a function of the expected aggregate level 
of child labor, is 5-shaped, as in the simple model in the previous sec-
tion.
1
4 In that case, from (8), increases in the wage rate would shift 
the 5-shaped curve downwards, as shown in figure 4. It is easy to ver-
ify that the supply of labor would then look as in figure 5. The types 
of multiplicity would then depend on the demand curve. Consider 
the following examples. 
Example 1. The demand curve is DL Equilibrium points are 
Dla, and Dl6. Dla is market stable and norm stable. For any pertur-
bation around that point, both wage adjustment and optimal child la-
bor supply would lead the economy back to the place where it started. 
Equilibrium Dl6, however, is norm-stable but market-unstable. If the 
wage increases slightly above the level consistent with such point, 
there will be excess demand for labor, which would cause the wage to 
increase even further, until it reaches point Dltt. The opposite would 
happen for reductions in the wage level. 
Example 2. The demand curve is D2. Again, there are three 
equilibria: D2a, D26, and D2C. Dla and Dlc are both norm and mar-
ket stable. Equilibrium point Dl6 is market-stable but norm-unstable. 
Small perturbations around such point would make people adjust 
their own child's labor supply in a way that would induce a feedback 
through the expected aggregate level of child labor, diverging from 
the initial point. 
Example 3. When the demand curve is as in D3, there will be 
three equilibria, all of them being norm-stable; only D36 is market-
unstable. 
Example I Flat labor demand curve, as in D4. Equilibrium 
points are D4a, D2b, and D4C. In such case, only D2b is norm-
unstable. 
1
4 This is equivalent to assuming that there exists an 0 < E < 1 such that 
d'^c* ~ — d^B _ n ~ 




which is equivalent to requiring that s"(É) < 0 if 0 < È < È, and s" (È) > 0 
if È < È < 1. This implies that at low levels of aggregate child labor in the 
economy, a reduction in such a level would increase the stigma cost at an increasing 
rate, for a given amount of individual child labor. Also, at large levels of E, an 
increase would reduce the stigma cost at an increasing rate. 212 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
Figure 4 
Individual and Aggregate Child Labor 
with S-shaped Stigma Cost 
From figures 4 and 5, for equilibria within the interval (N, (1 + 
7)7V), norm-stability will be satisfied along the negatively-sloped seg-
ments of the labor supply curve, Whereas equilibrium points along the 
positively-sloped segments are norm-unstable. This is due to the fact 
that the positively-sloped segment of the labor supply within that 
range derives from the unstable rational expectations equilibria in 
figure 4, for shifts of the S-shaped curve that are induced by changes 
in wages. 
The assumption of an S-shaped response curve is not necessary 
to obtain the types of multiplicity described above. As an example, 
if the stigma cost function were linear -the simplest case- the market 
would look as shown in figure 6. The equilibria along the positively 
sloped segment of the labor supply are all norm-unstable. A SOCIAL STIGMA MODEL  213 
Figure 5 
Different Examples for a Given Demand 
for Labor 
The results above are of special interest for the several reasons. 
First, the multiplicity arises from the social interactions, i.e, the exis-
tence of the social norm and the fact that individuals consider what 
the others do in order to optimally choose their own decision. Sec-
ond, the result is robust to different specifications of the demand for 
labor in the economy, which makes the multiplicity of equilibria de-
scribed above more likely to arise. Third, there exist equilibria that, 
though market-stable, are norm-unstable, and thus small perturba-
tions around equilibrium points would lead to a completely different 
final outcome, due to the relevance of the individuals' response to 
what they expect the others would do as a response of such a change. 
Finally, assuming that the existence of the stigma cost is a realistic 
assumption, room for intervention is related to the specific conditions 
of the labor market. Government policy could indeed play a role as 
a coordination device. Its effectiveness, however, is ambiguous and 
hence its applicability becomes an empirical question. 214 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
It is important to mention that related empirical work has found 
evidence of the relevance of this type of social interactions on child 
labor (Lopez-Calva, 2002). When the incidence of child labor in the 
community is taken as a variable related to the "social acceptance" 
of child labor, and controlling for all relevant economic and demo-
graphic variables, this variable does show a positive and statistically 
significant effect on the probability of a child working, using labor 
data for Mexico. 
Figure 6 
Individual-Aggregate Child Labor with Linear Stigma Cost 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Social norms matter in household decision making. This paper has 
developed a model of child labor supply where a social stigma is im-
posed on parents that send their children to work. This stigma cost A SOCIAL STIGMA MODEL  215 
which parents internalize in their preferences, declines as the propor-
tion of child labor in the economy increases. The latter comes from 
the fact that a community tends to be more tolerant of practices that 
are more prevalent. Wages for children and adults are determined in 
equilibrium, whereas parents take both the aggregate amount of child 
labor in the economy and the wages as given. 
Under reasonable assumptions as to stigma cost function, mul-
tiplicity of equilibria arise. This multiplicity is consistent with the 
results obtained in Basu and Van (1998). Moreover, in this case the 
result is robust to different specifications of the labor demand, in-
cluding a perfectly elastic one, as would be realistic in the case of a 
small, open economy (Dixit, 1998). Results are also consistent with 
an interpretation of the so-called "luxury axiom", introduced in Basu 
and Van (1998). It has been shown that there is a high enough level 
of wages beyond which child labor is eliminated. 
The interaction between the adult and the child labor market is 
hereby supported in a model where social interactions yield multiple 
equilibria. The main contribution of this paper is the introduction of 
social interactions into a model of child labor supply. According to 
the model, the better a substitute child labor is of adult labor, the less 
likely it is that the no-child labor equilibrium exists. Moreover, the 
equilibrium points could be either stable or unstable not only from 
the traditional perspective of market adjustment, but also through the 
parents' adjustment of their expectations of what the others would 
do, which is termed norm stability. Intervention could, under specific 
circumstances, switch the equilibrium from a situation of positive 
child labor to one without it, which may be preferred from a welfare 
perspective. The effect of interventions, however, turns out to be 
ambiguous in this model, and subject to conditions whose verification 
requires empirical investigation The latter is a promising avenue for 
future research. 
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